INTRODUCTION
Following a survey by Baumol and Bradford (1970) of the by now classical literature on second-best pricing for public enterprises a series of articles has focused on this topic. Conditions for prices to achieve a constrained welfare maximum are well-known. They are named after Ramsey, who first (1927) derived them as the solution to an optimal taxation problem. Welfare maximizing firms should inflate all demand elasticities for their products by a common factor and otherwise behave like an unconstrained monopolist (Dreze and Marchand, 1975) .
However, there remains the task of translating this rule into an incentive scheme for the firms so that it becomes operational for the firm management and the regulators. This question has been raised but left open by Bawa and Sibley (1975) within the scheme of rate-of-return regulation.
If regulators had to decide on efficient price structures, they would have to know demand elasticities and cost functions within some range of the current prevailing prices and current costs. In general, the firm's staff and managers will know price elasticities and cost functions for their products better than do regulators. Hence, the firm management may be in a superior position to calculate and implement welfare maximizing prices. But why should they? We see three basic reasons for them to do so. First, they may hold a professional 1 or humanitarian interest in pursuing a welfare-maximizing strategy. This cannot generally be expected from managers, and may even be an undesirable feature of somebody running an enterprise. Second, the survival of the firm may be in danger because of potential competition by newcomers.
Welfare-maximizing prices can then be a limit-pricing strategy in the sense that they are best sustainable.
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The empirical significance of this hypothesis remains largely unexplored. Third, the regulatory agency could try to force the firm to convey the necessary information or to compute welfare-maximizing prices. But without duplicating company management and staff, how could the regulators evaluate the information they receive? Even the firm is not sure of its demands and costs.
Discrepancies between ex post figures and projections previously filed with a regulatory agency are not necessarily evidence of cheating. The solution of this problem could be a well-defined rule that motivates firms to charge economically efficient prices.
Regulatory agencies may be excessively influenced or even corrupted by special interest groups. For this reason, an additional advantage of a predetermined price-setting rule is precisely that it prevents continuous direct intervention by an agency in the price structure used by a regulated firm.
As a first step in this direction we suggest a simple incentive mechanism which leads firm management to improve the price structure step by step and which, under certain conditions, results in an optimum. This is described in Section 2.2 after Section 2.1 has outlined the concept of 4 constrained welfare maximization used throughout in this paper. Sections 2.3 and 2.4, being the heart, give proof to our main proposition and the economic rationale behind it. Then, Section 2.5 and the Conclusion turn to the policy issues that might follow from our reasoning.
Two complications which our rule may have to face are dealt with in Section 2.6. One is that the firm tries to pass inside the effect of the short-term-oriented rule by using a long-term strategy. The other is that the firm does not face decreasing ray average costs.
THE MODEL

Characterization of Budget-Constrained Welfare Maximization
We consider a regulated private or public enterprise in a natural monopoly setting.
Assumption 1: (Objective of the regulatory agency) The firm's social objective as pursued by the regulatory agency is the maximization of welfare subject to a budget constraint:
with C(x) the cost function. This is restrictive insofar as income effects are taken to be insignificant. They could in fact play a major role, if a substantial part of the economy were regulated in the suggested way. 4 Then, however, regulation as a market-oriented policy becomes questionable.
Profits of the regulated firm have been eliminated from the welfare function because in the limit they will be shown to vanish. Also, welfare effects on commodities not supplied by the regulated firm are neglected. As long as the firm's input/output decisions do not substantially affect prices on other markets, such welfare effects will be small.
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The nontrivial first order condition for an optimum with n(p) < 0 is Diamond and Mirrlees (1971, p. 262) .6 An unconstrained profit-maximizing monopolist in equilibrium would satisfy
Condition 1 with x = 1, but at a constrained second best solution x will be just high enough to allow the firm to break even. Hence, at the optimum the isowelfare surface is tangent to the zero profit surface. In Fig. 2 , the shaded area corresponds to R The firm is allowed to maximize profit constrained by Rj. Indeed, the convergence to the optimal point requires just that.
The Regulatory Algorithm
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In spite of managerial theories of the firm and the satisficing literature we think it plausible that the management can be induced to conform with this objective to the extent that its income depends on profits and losses. Thus, if sufficiently motivated by a strong profit sharing scheme, the management will try to maximize (p) subject to Rj. Rj has been constructed by moving the tangent hyperplane R at pj into the direction of the largest welfare increase grad W(pj) = -xj. Now, assume the firm chooses the price vector Pj+I in period j + 1. In terms of welfare the firm cannot do worse than choose some point on the boundary of Rj. Then Fig. 2 suggests that W(pj+ 1 ) > W(pj). Rj can therefore be interpreted as a linear approximation of a minimum welfare constraint. The firm thus solves a problem quite similar to the dual of constrained welfare maximization. There welfare is the objective and profit the constraint.
Here profit is the objective and welfare the constraint.
The procedure can be repeated at the end of period j + 1 if n(Pj+l ) is nonnegative. It gives rise to an iterative process, which is described by the flow chart in Figure 3 .
The process can only work in the described manner, if the firm can always find a constrained price vector, which yields nonnegative profit ij.
This condition depends on the nature of the firm's cost function.
If the firm is a natural monopoly by conventional standards, it is fulfilled. This means that its cost function exhibits decreasing ray average costs, i.e. r > 1 C(rx) < r C(x). Decreasing ray average costs represent the natural extension of decreasing average costs to the Observe Impose Regulation Rj:
In a local context they are equivalent with the unprofitability of marginal cost prices. In precisely this situation Ramsey prices are relevant, for they maximize welfare under the constraint of the financial viability of the firm.
Our aim was to arrive at a mechanism that sets a limit on the firm's ability to influence its price level but at the same time gives it enough freedom of choice regarding the price structure. The method employed has some similarity with the construction of a price index. According to our suggestion the firm should have the freedom to choose prices in such a way that a Laspeyres price index for its products would not exceed a constrained level. This constraint reduces the level of the base period by at least the firm's profit margin in that period. This can be verified by considering the constraint R:
Ts j
Within the price level defined by this xjp.
xjp.
Laspeyres index the relative prices are allowed to vary. In the following period we therefore expect to get new quantities giving a new base for the index. The result is a monotonically decreasing Laspeyres chain index.
The proposed algorithm makes explicit use of a regulatory lag. In the literature, the benefits of such a lag have been stressed with respect to 13 lowering production costs. It has been shown that a lag can help to reduce factor distortion caused by regulation. If a breakeven constraint is imposed, a lag will force a profit-maximizing firm to produce at a cost-minimizing point (Bailey, 1973) . This result is also implied by our procedure. The breakeven constraint prevents a factor distortion of the Averch-Johnson kind to occur, because there is no asymmetric treatment of capital and the other factors of production. During the lag period of the process the firm is allowed to benefit from reducing its costs and changing its price structure vis-a-vis a maximum price level. Obeying Rj it will move into a profit-increasing direction.
In this direction, surplus must increase. At worst this additional surplus goes entirely to the firm. But in the next period the new regulatory constraint, Rj+1, absorbs the additional profit and hands it over to the consumers. Thus the firm always moves into the right direction both for itself and the public at large.
Our proposition is that the process described by Flow Chart I will converge to a constrained welfare maximum. Step 2: We show that W(pj) converges. Step 3 
Convergence of the Regulatory Algorithm
This Corollary shows that under Assumptions 2 to 4 constrained welfare optimization never decreases total surplus S(p) over the unregulated situation, in particular in comparison to the unconstrained profit-maximizing monopolist. In case of increasing ray average cost this result will not necessarily hold.
Characterization of the Point of Convergence
Proposition 1 establishes the convergence of the regulatory process to a welfare level W* = W(P) such that at p the first-order optimality Figure 5 . There p fulfills the tangency Condition 1. But the constrained local welfare maximum is at p*. Without formally introducing probability arguments, we can see: The algorithm would only by "extreme mischief" (measure zero)
arrive at such a point. Additionally, this point may be called Within the limits of bookkeeping and auditing, the information requirements with respect to the regulatory agency are low. The agency is supposed to have some general knowledge about the structure of the regulated industry, especially whether it produces at decreasing ray average costs. Furthermore, it has to know what has actually happened in the past, but not the full possibility set of the firm. This contrasts for instance with the problem solution of finding the optimal rate of return in the Averch-Johnson model (Klevorick, 1971) . Even with some knowledge of demand elasticities and costs in the neighborhood of the status quo of the firm, a regulatory agency can hardly hope to do better than approximate first-order conditions. To the best of our knowledge, all previous efforts to implement constrained welfare optimal prices have therefore taken the first-order conditions to be sufficient. Compared to this our procedure ensures that W(p) is no local minimum and that the point reached by the procedure is preferred to the status quo. Only in a small class of cases, to which we give little empirical significance, will the process stop short of a local welfare maximum.
The agency in our model has little discretionary power. It is, however, obliged to control the quality of the firm's output because the firm may want to reduce costs through hidden quality deterioration. This, of course, is a standard regulatory issue.
Some Qualifications and Extensions
Myopic Management Behavior
So far we have assumed that the firm maximizes profit in every period j subject to constraint Rj1. However, such myopic profit maximization may deviate from the long-run interest of the management, which is to maximize the discounted flow of future profits. Does the algorithm converge in this case?
The convergence of the algorithm depends on the simple inequality W(pj+ 1 ) > W(pj) + j. From this inequality it can be seen that the convergence is not affected as long as j > 0 for all j. The process, however, could converge to a suboptimal point, if the firm keeps profits sufficiently low. But this would mean that in total it foregoes profits which would be allowed and feasible. It can thus only be inferred that the convergence rate may be slower in earlier periods and faster in later periods compared to the rate corresponding to the myopic profit maximization case. Management may want to produce losses for some periods in order to recoup higher profits later. With decreasing ray average costs losses are an indication of either strategic behavior or mismanagement. Thus, if losses occur, the regulatory agency can either fire the management 1 2 or keep the previous regulatory constraint until profits turn up.
If profits occur, the regulatory constraint for the next period becomes more binding and therefore narrows the firm's discretion for the future.
Eventually, the firm will be forced by its profits to follow the convergence path. The higher the discount rate employed by the firm the more it will want to make higher profits early. Thus, a high discount rate may speed up the process.
Nondecreasing Ray Average Costs
Assumption 3(d), which postulates decreasing ray average cost may be violated even in case of a natural monopoly.
1 3 Therefore, the procedure described above should be adapted to the regulation of monopoly firms with nondecreasing ray average costs. As is illustrated in Figs. 6 and 7 for the simple case of a one-product firm, there can be a striking difference in applying the algorithm for a decreasing or nondecreasing (ray) average cost firm. With decreasing (ray) average cost profits always stay nonnegative, while with increasing (ray) average costs losses may be inevitable. For a one-product firm profits and losses will follow each other in a hog cycle manner. If, furthermore, the average cost curve is absolutely steeper than the demand curve the process will explode. Proof:
Step 1: We show that loop II is finite. We have j-1 = 0 implies
there exists a neighborhood of Pj1 such that for all p U (Pj_1)
Hence, there exists n E N such that 'd > 0.
Step 2: Coming out of loop II we have xjlP j -C(xj_ 1 )
Xj lPjl -C(xj_l) by construction of the constraint. Therefore sequence. From here on the proof follows steps 2 and 3 of the proof of Proposition 1 q.e.d.
The case of nondecreasing ray average cost is less straightforward than that of decreasing ray average cost. Although the arguments of section 2.4 carry over, the number of periods necessary to come close to the optimum may increase considerably due to loop II. Current profit is no longer a lower bound for next period's welfare increase. Furthermore, strategic firm behavior producing high losses in order to relax the constraint may be attractive.
On the other hand it can be hoped that the fear of cream-skimming competition will in this case limit the firm's discretion.
3. CONCLUSION
The process described rests on some general principles, which are not dependent on their regulatory application. As an equilibrium, letting the firm maximize profits subject to constraint on the welfare level of consumers generates an optimum. Convexity of the welfare function permits substitution of the tangent hyperplane for the indifference surface. Decreasing ray average costs or the mechanism of Flow Chart II prevent overshooting. Hence we can converge to a local optimum by raising the allowed welfare level in each step.
The regulatory algorithm can be interpreted as an incentive pricing mechanism in the sense of Cross (1970) . The regulated firm constrained by Rj is encouraged to exploit both the potential for cost decreases and the consumers' willingness to pay. The firm converts these into profits. But both these advantages are turned over to the consumers in the next period.
Our process does not differ substantially from the regulatory procedure which outside inflation periods traditionally has been used in the United States.
Here the rate level is set by applying a rate of return constraint on past cost and quantity data of the regulated monopoly firm. In theory, regulated firms are free then to adjust the rate structure subject to the proof that they stay within the overall rate of return constraint again based on past data. In practice, however, they meet many obstacles in doing so. Due to issues of discrimination rate structures show some inherent rigidity. As a policy recommendation this paper hence suggests that once the rate level has been established the actual freedom of the firms to alter their rate structure on profit-maximizing grounds should be increased. Basically the argument used for this recommendation is similar to the one in favor of a regulatory lag.
Enforcement of the regulatory constraint R developed in this paper could be supervised by auditing. Hence, its application could be prescribed to regulatory agencies by law. Once they have accepted the philosophy behind this approach regulatory agencies could go back to using their beloved concept of historic costs. 
First, observe that U(x, P 1 , M) < U(X(P 1 ), Pl, M)
and U(x, P2, M) < U(x(P2), P2, M)
for any and in particular for x = x(xpl + (1 -x)P 2 ).
Multiply (2) and (3) + (1 -) [U(x(P 2 ) -P 2 x(P 2 ) + M
1.
A professional interest in finding optimal price structures and in proving that they can be implemented may be assumed at the Electricite de France under the leadership of Boiteux who first solved the problem of constrained welfare optimization for public firms.
2.
For this see Baumol, Bailey, and Willig (1977) , or Panzar and Willig (1977) .
3.
The convexity assumption (a) follows from a revealed preference argument and the assumed absence of income effects. This argument we owe to C.C. von Weizsdcker. It is given in the appendix.
4.
The degree of approximation of more general welfare measures by consumer's surplus is given by Willig (1976).
5.
See Finsinger (1978) .
6. Diamond and Mirrlees use a much less restrictive framework. See also Baumol and Bradford (1970) .
7.
For simplicity corner solutions meaning zero prices are ignored here and throughout.
8. For a qualification see 2.6 below.
9.
See Baumol, Bailey, and Willig (1977) , Panzar and Willig (1977) , or Baumol (1977) for a discussion of the concept with the view of sustainability of public utility prices.
10. By not constraining the firm in the first period the regulatory agency can always induce the firm to start the process with profits.
11. We owe the basis of this point to an anonymous referee. The sustainability argument can lead to the same kind of policy conclusion. Indeed, in Germany peak-load pricing some decades ago was introduced by high-cost electric utilities threatened by competitive pressure and takeovers.
12.
In the context of U.S. regulation the agency can threaten to withdraw the firm's license.
13. Panzar and Willig (1977) show that subadditivity of the cost function does not imply decreasing ray average cost.
